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PATENTING GENOMIC TECHNOLOGY - 2001
UTILITY EXAMINATION GUIDELINES: AN
INCOMPLETE REMEDY IN NEED OF PROMPT
REFORM
Tanya Wei*
SUMMARY
The patent system protects a patentee's work-product
from potential infringers by preventing others from copying,
making, using, offering for sale, or selling another's work
without consent.' Consequently, researchers and their fund-
ing organizations seek protection in the regulations of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).2 How-
ever, in addition to protection from unlicensed future use of
their inventions, genomic companies use the patent system
offensively as a sword rather than a shield.3 Most prospective
gene patentees seek patent rights on genetic sequences,
which lack intrinsic marketability or definite utility.4 Ge-
nomic researchers employ their patents in the hope of exploit-
ing royalties from future researchers who use the claimed
fragment in ways uncontemplated by the original patentee.'
The USPTO tried to address the economic, scientific, and
ethical problems introduced by gene patenting via the
* Research Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 44. J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; M.P.H., Tufts University; B.A., The
Johns Hopkins University.
1. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2001).
2. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 66 (2d ed. 2001).
3. See Richard Saltus, Biotechnology; Priceless Letters as Scientists Un-
scramble the Letters that Spell Out the Human Genetic Code, Debate Heats Up
Over Who Should Profit, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 2000, at D3; see also CHI-
SUM, supra note 2, at 70-71.
4. See Martin Enserink, Patent Office May Raise the Bar on Gene Claims,
SCIENCE, Feb. 18, 2000, at 1196.
5. See id.
307
SANTA CLARA LA WREVIEW
amendment of its utility examination guidelines.6 Although
these revisions speak to the need for a more stringent patent
policy, this paper discusses how the USPTO's new guidelines
fall short of adequately addressing the numerous problems
emanating from the patentability of genes.' Tenets of basic
molecular biology and a description of DNA sequencing, in-
cluding the advent of DNA sequencing machines, introduce
the topic.' The dilemma inherent in the privatization of genes
provides a lens for analysis of the future of the USPTO's pat-
ent policies governing biotechnology.9 Finally, this paper will
examine the shortcomings of the USPTO's revised utility
guidelines for patentability and will suggest several proposals
for reform, such as more stringent policies against obvious-
ness, heightened utility standards for gene patents, and the
institution of morality requirements.'"
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of biotechnology has grown exponentially in the
past twenty-five years, with significant public benefit." In
particular, genetic research contributes to the development of
many of today's breakthrough pharmaceuticals and diagnos-
tic tests, such as the genetic screening test for Canavan dis-
ease' 2 and recombinant techniques for producing human insu-
lin." Research can take many years of commitment and
immense capital to successfully bring an innovation from the
laboratory bench to the marketplace. 4 Some research can re-
6. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-02 (Jan. 5, 2001).
7. Since the founders of the Constitution could not predict the future, legal
doctrines often change with time. See, e.g., Am. Fed'n. of Labor v. Am. Sash
Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949); Semler v. Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608 (1935). Often
these changes occur slowly. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,
489 (1955) (holding that the problem of legislative classification is a perennial
one which lacks doctrinaire definition, thus the legislature may select one phase
of one field and apply a remedy there while neglecting others).
8. See discussion infra Part II.C-D.
9. See discussion infra Parts III., IV.A-B.
10. See discussion infra Parts IV.C-D, V.
11. See Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, Comment, A Higher Nonobviousness Stan-
dard for Gene Patents: Protecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 143, 145 (2000).
12. Canavan disease is a degenerative neurological disorder.
13. See William A. Haseltine, The Case for Gene Patents; Technology In-
formation, TECH. REV. (CAMBRIDGE, MASS.), Sept. 1, 2000, at 59.
14. See Enserink, supra note 4, at 1196.
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quire companies to invest $500 million" on the mere probabil-
ity of a product's success.16  Patentees can justify the enor-
mous financial backing necessary to their research by charg-
ing royalties on a claimed invention during the life of the
patent." Thus, patent protection provides companies with a
foothold for commercial success in the biotech industry."8
Despite high initial costs, patents in the gene industry
have proven to be quite lucrative.' 9 Even at the current suc-
cess rate of 40% for biotechnology patents, most biotechnology
companies will more than quadruple their patent portfolios.0
In addition, these companies often charge other researchers
consultation fees ranging from five thousand dollars to five
million dollars just to view the company's data." Currently,
the biotech industry generates over $22 billion per year."
This figure piques the interests of many biotech companies to
obtain more patents. 3 In 1990, the USPTO received over
16,000 patent applications. 4 In 2000, that figure more than
doubled to 33,000. 2' Gregory Williams, the general counsel of
New England Biolabs, Inc., stated: "Technology feeds on it-
self. As the level of technology and the level of skill is raised,
it opens more doors. I don't see it slowing down any time
soon."
26
Modern, more efficient methods of discovery may explain
15. See Haseltine, supra note 13, at 59.
16. See Enserink, supra note 4, at 1196.
17. See id.; see also Adam Bryant & Gregory Beals, Who Will Own the Code
of Life? NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 2000, at 67 (stating that Miami Children's Hospi-
tal owns the rights to a patent on the Canavan gene and has developed a ge-
netic screening test for this disorder, but charges $12.50 to anyone who uses
this test).
18. See Naomi Aoki, Patent Applications Booming in Biotech Strides in
Human Genetic Code, Drive to Accrue Intellectual Capital Cited, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 30, 2000, at D1.
19. See John Reichard, Hearing Discusses Gene-Related Patents, MED. &
HEALTH, July 17, 2000, at 3.
20. See Aoki, supra note 18, at D1.
21. See Ben Macintyre, Challenge that Stunned America's Scientiic Estab-
lishment, THE TIMES (London), Mar. 15, 2000.
22. See Richard Willing, Gene Patents Get Tougher, USA TODAY, Nov. 15,
2000, at 14A.
23. See Paul Jacobs & Peter G. Gosselin, Errors Found in Patent for AIDS
Gene, Scientists Say; News Comes Amid Concerns that Genomics Race Could
Lead to Shoddy Science and Profiteering, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2000, at Al.
24. See Willing, supra note 22, at 14A.
25. See id.
26. See Aoki, supra note 18, at Dl.
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this boom.27 Results are obtained in a much shorter time" be-
cause computer searching replaced much of the book research
and discussions between scientists." Cloning and DNA se-
quencing research greatly expanded in genomics. ° As a re-
sult, a single machine now does the same work as a tradi-
tional team of researchers in a shorter amount of time.2 '
The advent of these sequencing machines fueled the race
to sequence genes." The 6,000 gene patents already approved
by the USPTO office, 3 1,000 of which are for human genes or
gene fragments, 4 reflect the biotech rush to capitalize on
these efforts and innovations." Because the human genome
consists of over three billion chemical units36 each with poten-
tially significant medical, health, or research benefits,37 re-
searchers scramble to stake a commercial claim in their
work.3" In fact, more than 40,000 gene patent applications
are still pending approval of the USPTO 9 Of these 40,000,
more than half relate to human genes.4" Millennium Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc., a biotechnology company that specializes in
gene-based drug discovery, has over 1,500 pending patent ap-
plications.4' Incyte Pharmaceuticals (Incyte) already holds
over 500 gene patents and has over 6,000 pending, while Cel-
era Genomics (Celera) has more than 6,500 gene patents filed
27. See Merrill Goozner, Patenting Life; Public Science Financed Break-
throughs in Genetic Research -- So Why Are Private Firms Allowed to Patent
Genes, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 18, 2000, at 23.
28. See Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 11, at 159.
29. See Goozner, supra note 27, at 23.
30. See Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 11, at 158-62.
31. See Deborah Josefson, Biotechnology Company Claims to Have 97% of
Human Genes on Its Database; Celera Genomics Group, W. J. MED., Apr. 1,
2000, at 228.
32. See Goozner, supra note 27, at 23.
33. See Jenna Greene, PTO to Rein in Gene Patents, LEGAL TIMES, July 24,
2000, at 12.
34. See id.
35. See Andrea Knox, Who Owns the Rights to Human Gene Data? The
Medical Community Always Has Benefited from Sharing Information. But To-
day's Gene Research Is Changing That, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 19, 2000, at
G1.
36. See James J. Muchmore, Proprietary Rights and the Human Genome
Project: A Legal and Economic Perspective, 8 DIG. 45, 46 (2000).
37. See Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 11, at 145-47.
38. See Knox, supra note 35, at G1.
39. See Willing, supra note 22. at 14A.
40. See Goozner, supra note 27, at 23.
41. SeeAoki, supra note 18, at Dl.
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with the USPTO.42 Both public and private researchers lik-
ened this offensive gene patenting to a genetic gold rush. 3
Substantially burdensome to the limited resources of the
USPTO," this increase in the number of gene patent applica-
tions also raises basic questions. What do the patent claims
look like?45 Are they too broad?46 How can the right to gene
ownership be justified?47 Are frivolous applications being
filed?48 To address the many issues surrounding the pat-
entability of genes and partial gene sequences, or expressed
sequence tags (ESTs), the USPTO revised the utility re-
quirement for patent applications in January 200 1. 4 Accord-
ingly, the U.S. presently validates applications for isolated
genes and gene fragments, provided three utility criteria for
patents are satisfied-specificity, substantiality, and credibil-
ity.5" These new requirements aim to narrow patent claims as
well as reduce the number of unsubstantiated applications.5
However, when viewed from the perspective of EST patent
applications, the new utility requirements are not stringent
enough. Many genome researchers are uncertain about an
EST's genomic functioning or simply fail to realize other pos-
sible uses." These researchers lack a sufficient claim to the
genes, yet still will gain commercial rights to their ESTs.5
The acquisition of rights in gene fragments may have an ef-
fect counter to the goals of patent law to promote science and
42. See Goozner, supra note 27, at 23.
43. See, e.g., Saltus, supra note 3, at D3; Goozner, supra note 27, at 23.
44. See, e.g., Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 11, at 143; Jenna Greene, The
Changing Climate PTO Faces New Workload and IP Challenges, INTELL. PROP.
STRATEGIST, Jan. 2001, at 5.
45. See generallyGoozner, supra note 27.
46. See Jenna Greene, PTO Set to Tighten Standards for Gene Patents,
RECORDER, July 27, 2000, at 3.
47. See id.
48. See generally Saltus, supra note 3.
49. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-02, 1098-99 (Jan.
5, 2001).
50. See id.
51. See Elizabeth Howard & William Anthony, New PTO Guidelines Only
Say ESTs Are Protectable, Courts Must Now Decide Reach of Patents for Ex-
pressed Sequence Tags, 23 NAT'L L.J. C3, C10 (2001) (discussing the PTO's con-
cern over EST patents and the PTO's new requirements in evaluating ESTs for
patentability).
52. See Donald L. Zuhn, Jr., Comment, DNA Patentability: Shutting the
Door to the Utility Requirement, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 973, 977-83 (2001).
53. See Enserink, supra note 4, at 1196.
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the useful arts. 4
The following sections will first give some background on
genetics and DNA sequencing."5 The paper will then analyze
some issues raised by the privatization of genes and ESTs."6
Next, the paper will discuss patent protection in relation to
genes. 7 The subsequent section will review the new utility
guidelines by the USPTO and address their shortcomings as
applied to gene patents. 8 Part V will propose reform meas-
ures that may better address the existing problems with the
purpose and scope of patent laws and the unanticipated boom
of biotechnology research.59 These reforms include heighten-
ing the standard for nonobviousness, re-instituting a Bren-
ner-type standard, and imposing a morality requirement. °
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Patent Act
In the words of Abraham Lincoln, "[Patents] couple the
fuel of interest to the fire of genius."6' The Venetians origi-
nally developed the concept of a patent system as a social con-
tract between society and the inventor.62 With this system,
the Venetians aspired to promote trade and commerce, while
eschewing the notions of trade secrets.6" Congress' enactment
of the Patent Act parallels that of the Venetians.'
The advancement of science relies upon the sharing of
new knowledge and innovations to allow others to build upon
them and create new knowledge and innovations of their
own.65 In Article I, drafters of the U.S. Constitution sought to
encourage this dissemination of ideas when they stipulated
that Congress has the power "to promote the progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
54. See id.
55. See discussion infra Part II.A-B.
56. See discussion infra Part III.
57. See discussion infra Parts II.A-B, IV.A-B.
58. See discussion infra Part JV.C-D.
59. See discussion infra Part V.
60. See id.
61. Haseltine, supra note 13, at 59.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See CHISUM, supra note 2, at 11.
65. See id. at 70.
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thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."66 Thus, in 1790 the Patent Act
was born.67 Although the Act has been amended and recodi-
fled, it continues to enumerate the requirements for obtaining
a patent and explains the ensuing rights of a patentee.68
The patent system is structured around several theo-
ries.69 It provides an incentive to invent, to disclose, to com-
mercialize, and to design around." As a patent creates tem-
porary commercial monopolies for the patent holder, it
provides an economic incentive for researchers to invent.7
Dissemination of a patentee's written disclosure of the inven-
tion furthers innovative research so that others are able to
then reproduce, use, and build upon the patent's ideas.72
Patent rules require the inventor to state a specific use-
fulness for the invention.73 In the seminal case of Brenner v.
Manson,74 the inventor applied for a process patent for mak-
ing certain steroids.75 Although Manson's process produced
steroids with no known utility, he argued that an adjacent
homologue of his steroidal process demonstrated tumor-
inhibiting effects in mice that met the utility requirement for
patentability.76 The Supreme Court refused to extend Man-
son patent protection unless his invention had a specific use-
fulness in its present state.77 "Unless and until a ... specific
benefit exists in currently available form -- there is insuffi-
cient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what
may prove to be a broad field."78 Justice Abe Fortas explained
that a patent is "not a hunting license," but, is the "compen-
sation for [research's] successful conclusion" and "must be re-
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
67. See CHISUM, supra note 2, at 18.
68. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2001) (containing provisions of the
U.S. patent code). 35 U.S.C. § 112 describes the requirements for written de-
scription. Id. A description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the
art to recognize that the patentee invented what he claimed. See Vas-Cath v.
Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
69. See CHISUM, supra note 2, at 70.
70. See id.
71. Seeid. at 70-71.
72. See id. at 75.
73. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
74. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
75. Id. at 520.
76. Id. at 531.
77. Id. at 534-35.
78. Id.
313
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
lated to the world of commerce."79 A patent is the quid pro
quo for the public's deriving an invention with substantial
utility.,,
Of course, this limited monopoly entitles the original pat-
entee to receive royalties from others who may use the work
during the term of the patent.8 ' In turn, downstream re-
searchers may further promote the sciences with innovations,
which they hope eventually to patent. 2 As the demand for a
patented product increases in the marketplace, downstream
researchers have even more incentive to create non-infringing
substitutes or improvements.83 Hence, the patent system
greatly benefits society by expediting the discovery of new
medications, technologies, and non-infringing improvements
while decreasing consumer costs through the development of
non-infringing substitutes.8
B. The Advent of Biotechnology Patents
In the seminal case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,85 the Su-
preme Court confronted the issue of the patentability of ge-
netically engineered bacterium.86 The patent applicant in this
case claimed to have invented "a bacterium from the genus
Pseudomonas containing therein at least two stable energy-
generating plasmids.""7 Ordinarily, a single Pseudomonas
bacterium is incapable of breaking down oil. Chakrabarty,
however, discovered plasmids capable of degrading individual
components of oil and developed a process whereby these
plasmids could transfer into a single bacterium capable of
79. Id. at 536 (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 970 (C.C.P.A. 1965)
(posing philosophical questions regarding what constitutes the "invention" of a
new compound and concluding that a patent system must be related to the
world of commerce rather than to the realm of philosophy)).
80. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
81. See CHISUM, supra note 2, at 70-71.
82. See id. at 70-75.
83. See id. at 75.
84. See also Saltus, supra note 3, at D3 (noting the statement of Chuck Lud-
lam, Vice President for Government Relations for the Biotechnology Industrial
Organization: "For patients awaiting therapies and cures for deadly disease,
there is hardly a more important issue than patents.., without patents pri-
vate-sector research leading to gene-based medicines will be very, very lim-
ited.").
85. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
86. Id. at 307.
87. Id. at 305 (quoting the patent application at issue in Chakrabarty).
88. Id.
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multiple component oil degradation. 89
Through an analysis of 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Court held
the statute to mean that patentable subject matter "include[s]
anything under the sun made by man."9 However, manifes-
tations of nature, such as the laws of nature, physical phe-
nomena, and abstract ideas, are free to all and consequently
are not patentable.9' In this case, Chakrabarty's bacteria
were not the "handiwork of nature," but the result of human
ingenuity and research.92 Thus, Chakrabarty paved the way
for genetic technology patents.
In In re Deuel, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit questioned whether a patent could claim a DNA se-
quence when at least part of the amino acid sequence of the
encoded protein is known.93 The court reiterated an earlier
opinion stating that in the absence of prior art suggesting the
claimed DNA sequence, Deuel's DNA sequence was nonobvi-
ous and, therefore, patentable because of the redundancy of
the genetic code and the enormous number of sequences that
could code for one protein. 4
Consequently, "whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may ob-
tain a patent therefore."'" As long as the patentee can over-
come anticipation and obviousness, he can patent anything
that does not occur in nature.9" Therefore, the question now
is whether genes constitute a "manufacture" or a "composition
of matter."97
C. Genetics and Molecular Biology Basics
To better explain the legal issues surrounding the patent-
ing of genes, some background information on genetic re-
search and DNA sequencing is helpful.
89. Id. at 305-06.
90. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952)).
91. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
92. Id. at 310-13.
93. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
94. Id. at 1558-59; see also In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding
that the proper issue for determining patentability is the obviousness of the
DNA sequence claimed, not the method by which it is made).
95. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001) (emphasis added).
96. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
97. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
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Individual cells compose the human body and all of its
organs.98 Although different cells have different biological
roles, most consist of the same genetic material and have the
same biochemical structures."9 Genes control these various
cellular functions and serve as the cells' genetic blueprint.10
DNA is the code for this blueprint.' ° The language of the
DNA code is expressed through four deoxyribonucleotide
bases: adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C), and thymine
(T). °2 Different combinations of these bases dictate the prop-
erties and functions of a gene.' 3 Genes control protein syn-
thesis within a cell.' Because virtually everything is made of
protein or by protein via enzyme activity, proteins direct al-
most every cellular function.' 5
The base sequences are serially arranged along two com-
plementary DNA strands.' 6 A gene can be identified by its
DNA strands and by the specific order of base sequences DNA
strands contain.' 7 A codon, which is a sequential grouping of
three nucleotide bases, encodes for one out of a possible
twenty amino acids.' A particular sequence of amino acids
codes for a particular protein.0 9 For example, if a sequence of
nucleotides is known, then an amino acid sequence can be de-
termined and used to sequence a protein."0 However, since
there are more possible triplet groupings to form a codon than
there are amino acids, a particular amino acid can be coded
for in more than one way."' Thus, knowledge of a protein and
98. See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 28-34
(3d ed. 1994).
99. See id. at 41.
100. See id. at 104-05.
101. See BENJAMIN LEWIN, GENES VI 71-76 (6th ed. 1997).
102. See id. at 76-79.
103. See id. at 71-74.
104. See ALBERTS, supra note 98, at 104-05.
105. See id. at 111-30.
106. See id. at 76-82.
107. See id. at 86-87.
108. See id. at 86-88, 213-15. A DNA sequence can also have non-coding re-
gions, which do not play a role in protein synthesis, and regulatory regions,
which basically inform the gene when to start or stop the process of protein syn-
thesis. See id.
109. See id. at 8-13. Proteins differ from one another due to their unique se-
quence of amino acids. See id.
110. SeeALBERTS, supra note 98, at 111-30.
111. See LEWIN, supra note 101, at 213-15. A codon consists of three of the
four nucleotide bases. Since there are only twenty natural amino acids, there
are sixty-four possible codons. See id. at 213.
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its amino acid sequence does not necessarily mean that its
nucleotide sequence can be inferred.'12 Scientists refer to this
phenomenon as redundancy or degeneracy of the genetic
code. 13
Each unique amino acid sequence consequently affects a
protein's biochemistry."' Proteins affect the phenotypic and
genotypic expressions of a particular genetic trait"5 and influ-
ence just about every cellular function and biological process
within a living organism."' Clearly, DNA sequencing is ex-
tremely important in our understanding of life and how living
organisms function."'
D. DNA Sequencing and Sequencing Machines
When gene analysis first began, the process was pains-
takingly slow compared to modern methods."8 In the past,
scientists extracted genetic material from persons already
identified as carriers for a particular disease."9 Then, they
tried to manually identify the particular gene and its function
for the next several years."O The scientists inserted the genes
into artificial bacterial chromosomes and mapped and se-
quenced their positions on these chromosomes."'2 Today, the
process starts with the genomic code and ends with a particu-
lar protein and its function.'22
Gene sequencers, which are comparable in size to small
refrigerators, "speed-read" genes.' Basically, these ma-
chines: 1) fragment genes, 2) propagate millions of copies of
each fragment, 3) reassemble these fragments using linking
DNA fragments of known length to close any gaps, 4) delete
these linkers once missing pieces are found, and finally 5) re-
112. SeeALBERTS, supra note 98, at 111-30.
113. See LEWIN, supra note 101, at 213-15. Genotype refers to the genetic
constitution of an individual. Phenotype refers to the visible characteristics of
the individual produced by the genotype and the environment.
114. See ALBERTS, supra note 98, at 8-13.
115. See LEWIN, supra note 101, at 61-63.
116. SeeALBERTS, supra note 98, at 111-30.
117. Seeid at291.
118. See Goozner, supra note 27, at 23.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See Josefson, supra note 31, at 228.
122. See Goozner, supra note 27, at 23.
123. See Saltus, supra note 3, at D3.
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assemble the base pairs. '  The machines subsequently
download the sequences to a computer library of existing
ESTs.'25 With very little manpower, these machines provide a
rapid, large-scale method for sequencing the genetic code and
a reasonable extrapolation of the functions of ESTs. 126 Unlike
human researchers, these machines can run twenty-four
hours a day, seven days a week.127 For example, Celera's gene
machine sequences roughly two billion base pairs each
month. 128
The biotechnology companies employing this technology
are private and are not obligated to share their information.
121
Yet, publicly funded institutions such as the National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH), which funds the Human Genome Pro-
ject, are compelled to publish newly sequenced genes within
twenty-four hours.3 °  Consequently, although Celera se-
quenced a majority of the human genome using its own re-
sources, it inferred almost 10% of the genome using the data
published by the NIH.' Given a genome size of about 80,000
genes, roughly 8,000 were sequenced using NIH's work-
product.'32 Thus, the research done by the NIH benefits pri-
vate companies, but not vice-versa."3 This dichotomy further
complicates the patentability of genes by questioning the pro-
priety of private companies with exclusive rights to an EST,
which may have been successfully sequenced in part due to
previously disclosed, but unpatented, NIH research."'
III. LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING THE PRIVATIZATION OF GENES
AND GENE FRAGMENTS
A complete set of DNA provides extremely useful infor-
124. See Josefson, supra note 31, at 228.
125. See id.
126. See Goozner, supra note 27, at 23.
127. SeeJosefson, supra note 31, at 228.
128. See id.
129. See id
130. See id. The NIH, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the Sanger Cen-
tre in Cambridge, England fund the Human Genome Project. Under the Ber-
muda Agreement, this public consortium is obliged to publish its findings onto a
publicly accessible website within twenty-four hours. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Josefson, supra note 31, at 228.
134. See id.
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mation with a lucrative promise of patent royalties. 135 From
these gene sequencing and characterization efforts, one
learns how genes interact with each other, how their regula-
tory functions work, how disruption of these regulatory inter-
actions trigger genetic diseases like cancer or Alzheimer's,'36
or how diseases such as AIDS can be transmitted. 137  Re-
searchers hope to develop safer, more effective drugs, new
treatments, and various diagnostic tools.'38 With both fame
and fortune at stake, researchers and biotech companies
clamor to identify genes and their corresponding proteins. '39
Competition among companies, along with the acceler-
ated research capabilities of the gene sequencing machines,
brought an incredible number of new technologies to fruition
in a short amount of time. " ° For example, Celera began its
sequencing project in September 1999 and completed the ven-
ture in June 2000. " l The company's original schedule was
remarkably outpaced, and the media toted Celera's efforts as
an example of the value of competition."' However, this gene
competition is not necessarily framed around the incentive to
invent, but the desire for the temporary exclusionary period
in the commercial market, which patents afford their hold-
143
ers.
Gene patents allow companies with novel information to
charge others who may later use this technology, whether in
treatments or screening tests, in order to recoup the large in-
vestment capital used to fund the original research.44 With-
out patent protection, marketable products are less likely to
arrive on the shelves. Further, patents and their written
descriptions ensure that completed research enters the public
135. See Reichard, supra note 19, at 3.
136. See LEWIN, supra note 101, at 1131-72.
137. See Tatjana Dragic et al., HIV-1 Entry into CD4+ Cells Is Mediated by
the Chemokine Receptor CC-CKR-5, 381 NATURE 667 (1996).
138. See Saltus, supra note 3, at D3.
139. See id. But cf Jacobs & Gosselin, supra note 23, at Al (quoting William
Haseltine, chair and CEO of Human Genome Sciences: "The fight going on now
is not ... about who gets credit ... but who gets [the] money.").
140. See Goozner, supra note 27, at 23.
141. See, e.g., id.; Josefson, supra note 31, at 228.
142. See Goozner, supra note 27, at 23.
143. See Knox, supra note 35, at G1.
144. See Raymond F. Gesteland, Does Gene Patenting Stifle Research and
Growth in Utah's Healthcare Industry, UTAH BUS., June 1, 2001, at 18.
145. See id.
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arena and that others can build upon the technology. 146 How-
ever, "there [always] exists a dangerous combination of
power, money, and market economy' 14' as patents confer the
right to exclude others from benefiting from the technology. 148
Patentees may prevent competitors from using their
technology, specify conditions of use,'149 and charge royalties."'
Public health may suffer because of these economic and aca-
demic prohibitions."' For example, Celera plans eventually to
make its gene sequences publicly available,'52 but currently
intends first to turn a profit by licensing certain gene se-
quences of particular diseases to large pharmaceutical com-
panies such as Pfizer, Novartis, and Rhone-Poulenc or to its
genome library's paid subscribers." 3 Restriction on the use of
a gene to one or a limited number of laboratories will retard
further research efforts, and the public will suffer as a re-
sult.14 Unlike the practices of the NIH, many of these gene-
sequencing companies do not immediately publish their work
in an attempt to be the first to generate a profit."' These
gene sequencing companies work on securing a patent and us-
ing the information to solicit funding from drug companies." 6
These practices may cause delay in the development of new
drugs and diagnostic tools, causing the public to lose quick
146. See CHISUM, supra note 2, at 70-75.
147. Mary Kwang, Should Genes Be Patented, STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE),
June 5, 2000, at 17 (quoting Dr. Xu Zhi-Wei, Professor of Bioethics at the Uni-
versity of British Columbia in Vancouver).
148. See CHISUM, supra note 2, at 70-71.
149. See id. at 75.
150. See Knox, supra note 35, at G1.
151. But see Enserink, supra note 4, at 1196 (claiming that gene-based drugs
would never reach the market without intellectual property protection).
152. SeeJosefson, supra note 31, at 228.
153. See id.; see also Goozner, supra note 27, at 23 (describing this situation
as monopolistic). But see Aoki, supra note 18, at D1 (explaining that companies
are not trying to squeeze out competition, but instead simply trying to claim
competitive advantages).
154. See Knox, supra note 35, at G1; see also Aoki, supra note 18, at D1
(quoting Dr. Aubrey Milunsky, Director of the Center for Human Genetics at
the Boston University School of Medicine: "By doing so, they would ultimately
exclude someone else from working on that gene."). But see id. (noting that pat-
ents do not impede science because patent applications require detailed written
descriptions that allow for replication and freedom to use the technology in a
non-commercial way).
155. SeeJosefson, supra note 31, at 228.
156. See id.
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access to new drugs.'57 Such pecuniary practices may "substi-
tute the judgment of profit-making companies for our judg-
ment as physicians. '
Many critics of gene patenting argue that human genes
are an intrinsic part of the human body, thus ownership of a
gene is like ownership of any other part of the body.15 How-
ever, patents do not confer ownership, but merely confer a
right to preclude others from using the claimed invention. 6 '
Furthermore, one does not patent a gene, but patents the
code of symbols, which describe that gene and the methods to
manipulate the gene.' Thus, no one ever "owns" a human
gene.
6 2
Although humans have only one genome, the genetic in-
formation contained in the genome can exist in two different
formats. 63 One format is the raw sequence of the human ge-
nome, consisting of the entire sequence of nucleotide bases
that either code for amino acids or do not code for anything at
all."M The raw sequence is a natural manifestation of nature,
not made by the human hand.'6 ' The other format consists of
the cloned or isolated and purified partial DNA fragments.'66
Unlike the raw sequence, which exists as a purely natural
substance and thus remains unpatentable, the DNA frag-
ments must be excised from the natural context of the human
genome, isolated, purified, and cloned before scientists can
study them.'67 Since the sequenced gene fragments, like
ESTs, do not exist in their natural state and are therefore
"not nature's handiwork," they are "patentable subject matter
157. See Claire Curran, Who's Right to Patent Our Genes, CHEMISTRY AND
INDUSTRY, May 7, 2001, at 268.
158. Knox, supra note 35, at G1 (quoting Dr. Debra Leonard, Chief of the Mo-
lecular Pathology Laboratory at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania).
159. See Penny Fannin, Patent Critics Try to Stop Human-Gene Slave Tade,
SUNDAY AGE (MELBOURNE), Mar. 19, 2000, at 6.
160. See CHISUM, supra note 2, at 70-75.
161. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001); see also Haseltine, supra note 13, at 59 (ex-
plaining the misconceptions regarding gene patents).
162. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
163. See Saltus, supra note 3, at D3.
164. See id.
165. See Lisa M. Krieger, US. Allows Patenting for Genes of Humans, Long-
A waited RulingMay Slow Rush, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 5, 2001, at IA.
166. See Saltus, supra note 3, at D3.
167. See In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding that
proteins purified from their natural setting were patentable).
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under §101." 16s Hence, gene patentees can circumvent the
"anything in nature" prohibition for patents. '6 9
IV. AN ANLYSIS OF GENE PATENTS UNDER THE REVISED
GUIDELINES
Scholars, patentees, physicians, and patients hotly de-
bate whether the USPTO should grant portions of the human
genome patent protection. 70
A. Legal Issues Concerning Gene Patents
There was little debate in the field when gene patents
first began to issue in the late 1970s.'7 ' As a result of the
painstaking process of taking a gene and its protein expres-
sion and linking them backwards to a genomic code, scientists
closely correlated a gene to a specific cause of a disease or de-
veloped a treatment for a particular disease, and eventually
patented their gene sequence.'
72
Today, computer searches characterizing genes based on
probability replace experimental laboratory data.17 '3 Because
gene machines compare the gene fragments to a library of
known ESTs, they only infer protein expression and function
from the code, yielding largely theoretical information. 4 Un-
fortunately, these inferred utilities might result in an inaccu-
rate or underinclusive characterization of the EST's true
functions.' For example, an unknown gene may have strik-
ing similarity to a gene known to have hydrophobic quali-
ties.7 7 Hence, the sequencer will infer that the unknown gene
168. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980); see also Amgen v.
Chugai Pharm., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (limiting patents to cloned DNA
sequences and refusing to grant generic claims for all possible DNA sequences).
169. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1911) (stating that through the process of isolating and purifying a hormone,
the hormone "becomes for every practical purpose a new thing .... That is a
good ground for a patent.").
170. See Haseltine, supra note 13, at 59.
171. See Greene, supra note 33, at 12.
172. See id.
173. See Jacobs & Gosselin, supra note 23, at Al.
174. Contra Enserink, supra note 4, at 1196 (explaining that homology
searches are an accepted way of ascribing a gene's function and virtually 100%
correct).
175. See Jacobs & Gosselin, supra note 23, at Al.
176. Hydrophobic, or nonpolar, parts of molecules attract each other in the
presence of water or other polar fluids. Because water repels hydrophobic mole-
cules, these molecules form clumps with one another so that the clumped interi-
[Voh:44
2003] PATENTING GENOMIC TECHNOLOGY
probably will produce a protein that floats in a cell mem-
brane.'77 But, scientists must perform more research to con-
clusively determine its cell membrane function and possibly
other, more significant functions.'78
Those opposed to gene patents argue that isolated genes
are not invented, but discovered.'79 The "researchers" are
really the gene sequencing machines that run twenty-four
hours a day to determine the ESTs and to infer the expres-
sion of a protein. 8 ' Thus, the product of human ingenuity is
in fact the gene sequencer, and the genomic sequences are the
handiwork of these machines. Nevertheless, statutory law
ensures that the USPTO cannot reject a patent application
based on the manner in which the invention was developed.'
However, once an inventor files a patent application, oth-
ers can oppose it on the grounds of novelty."2 An inventor can
never invent a gene because genes existed since the beginning
of time and are not new compositions.'83 Furthermore, genes
are not novel because they are closer to being discoveries than
new compositions."' One can argue that if the USPTO
granted gene patents, then anyone carrying a patented gene
in his or her body would infringe on the gene patentee's
rights. 8' However, the USPTO disagrees with this argument
because a gene patent covers an isolated, purified gene, not a
naturally occurring gene that exists within the human
ors face away from, and thus exclude water or other polar molecules. See En-
serink, supra note 4, at 1196.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See, e.g., M. Scott McBride, Comment, Patentability of Human Genes:
Our Patent System Can Address the Issues Without Modification, 85 MARQ. L.
REV. 511, 518-20 (2001); Greene, supra note 46, at 3; see also Saltus, supra note
3, at D3 (quoting Bob Franza, biologist at Washington University in St. Louis,
who stated that "DNA in the genes is a product of evolution, not of man").
180. See Jacobs & Gosselin, supra note 23, at Al (quoting Tanya Dragic of
the Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New York). "[S]ophisticated equip-
ment and computers analyze the utility of a gene sequence. It isn't ... hard
work... [or] innovative work." Id.
181. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2001); see also Carter-Wallace v. Gillette, 675 F.2d
10, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1981) (explaining that for an invention to be patentable, "it is
immaterial whether it resulted from long toil and experimentation or from a
flash of genius").
182. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2001).
183. See McBride, supra note 179, at 518.
184. See id.
185. See id.
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body. 186
B. Theoretical Issues Concerning Gene Patents Based on
Fundamental Reasons for Patent Law
Some argue that the granting of patent monopolies for
genes restricts the promotion of science and research. One
gene contains many ESTs, each of which can code for a func-
tional protein. 87 Thus, one gene may code for several various
protein functions.88 Problems arise when different research-
ers want use to the same gene to find treatments for different
diseases. The inability to assert patent rights to an already
patented gene fragment may deter other researchers from
further investigating the same fragment.'89 In addition, the
original patentee may not choose to license the EST to an-
other competitor. Alternatively, the commercial incentive to
invent or further discover may decrease due to the royalty
payments by researchers to the patentee or the possible re-
duction in profits. In this way, patents discourage research
on the function of genes and their relation to various diseases
and stifle the development of new medicines or other tech-
nologies. 9 °
The methodology of modern sequencing represents an
additional problem with gene patentability. The high-speed
search machines neither infer possible useful drugs or thera-
peutics nor investigate the possible interactions of ESTs with
other sequences.'91  Consequently, the utility disclosure
needed for patent protection may be inadequate, because a
potential gene patentee may not fully understand the gene's
function. In this case, a patent grant not only would be coun-
terintuitive to the basic requirements of patents, but also
would be unfair to later researchers and harmful to the pub-
186. See id. at 520; see also Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg.
1092-02, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) (listing USPTO's responses to comments regarding
the 1999 Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines).
187. See ALBERTS, supra note 98, at 8-13.
188. Seeid. at 111-30.
189. See, e.g., Gesteland, supra note 144, at 18; Enserink, supra note 4, at
1196.
190. Cf McBride, supra note 179, at 525-27. Gene patenting does not dis-
courage invention because 1) patents are time-limited, 2) most inventions have
favorable licensing terms, 3) a second researcher who discovers a new use can
patent that process, and 4) cross-licensing needs cause researchers to share in-
formation. Id.
191. See Enserink, supra note 4, at 1196.
[Vo1:44
2003] PATENTING GENOMIC TECHNOLOGY 325
liC.1
92
By promising recoupment of investments and royalty
profits, patents give an economic incentive to invent.9 Giv-
ing patent rights to a researcher who lacks a clear under-
standing of the EST's function would allow gene patentees to
unfairly benefit from future studies conducted with or related
to the same EST."" For instance, Human Genome Sciences
(HGS) received a patent on the CCR5 gene by describing its
utility as a screening tool for receptor agonists and antago-
nists9 ' as well as for gene mutation detection.'96 At the time
of the application, HGS neither claimed nor contemplated an
anti-viral utility.'97 However, through subsequent research,
the NIH determined that the gene played a role in the trans-
mission of the AIDS virus and identified CCR5 as the docking
mechanism on cell surfaces used by the virus to infect cells.9
HGS will collect a windfall if this mechanism becomes part of
a new therapy to fight the deadly disease.'99 In fact, in early
2000, HGS executed a licensing agreement with Praecis
Pharmaceuticals for the development of a HIV therapy based
on CCR5 and already began to reap rewards. °°
Moreover, if the USPTO cannot guarantee intellectual
property protection for one's work-product based on a pat-
ented EST, pharmaceutical companies may not be willing to
invest the capital needed to develop useful drugs and innova-
tive therapies from the EST. 2°1 The emergence of new tech-
nologies, especially in the field of genomics, forced the USPTO
to address a number of the aforementioned issues in its revi-
192. See also Greene, supra note 33, at 12 (quoting Harold Varmus, Presi-
dent of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center and former Director of the Na-
tional Institutes of Health, 1993-1999). "Overly enthusiastic protection of intel-
lectual property, too early in the process of product development, can impede
the delivery of public health benefits." Id.
193. See CHISUM, supra note 2, at 70-71.
194. See Enserink, supra note 4, at 1196.
195. An agonist is a chemical substance capable of combining with a nervous
receptor and initiating a response. An antagonist is a chemical substance that
reduces the physiological activity of another chemical substance by combining
with and blocking its nervous receptor.
196. See Mattias Luukkonen, Note, Gene Patents: How Useful Are the New
Utility Requirements, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 337, 353-54 (2001).
197. See id. at 354.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See Enserink, supra note 4, at 1196.
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sion of the Utility Examination Guidelines. 2 However, these
guidelines remain inadequate.
The revised guidelines specifically address the utility and
written description requirements for patentability.2"3 The
guidelines not only assist patent examiners, but also assist
the public with standards for patentability, especially for
emerging technologies such as genomic research.2 4 However,
because the USPTO is bound by 35 U.S.C. § 101 and case law,
the revised guidelines only reflect the USPTO's understand-
ing of § 101.20 Thus, the revisions do not constitute legisla-
tive action and lack the force and effect of law.2 6 Conse-
quently, an appeal cannot be based on a USPTO examiner's
failure to follow the guidelines, but must have a basis in sub-
stantive law.207
C. Statutory Requirements
All patent applications must meet certain statutory re-
quirements of utility (application in commercial or real-world
use),28 novelty (no previous disclosure of the work),0 9 and
nonobviousness (inventiveness).2 10 Additionally, the invention
disclosure must sufficiently enable one skilled in the art to
make and use the invention without undue experimenta-
tion.2 ' Because the USPTO faced many problems with the
patenting of gene fragments and needed stricter policies, the
USPTO revised its utility and written description require-
202. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-02, 1092-97 (Jan.
5, 2001).
203. See id. at 1097-99.
204. See id. at 1092-98.
205. See id. at 1096.
206. See id. at 1098.
207. See id.
208. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001). This section ensures that a patentee pro-
vides society with an invention that operates in accordance with its intended
purpose or a purpose discernible to a person skilled in the art. See CHISUM, Su-
pra note 2, at 707.
209. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2001). Patent applicants must contribute some-
thing new to society to avoid granting a patent to an invention which already
exists. See CHISUM, supra note 2, at 323.
210. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2001). This section prevents a patent applicant
patent protection on an invention which could be derived or obtained from
available technical literature or other public sources. See CHISUM, supra note
2, at 514.
211. See35 U.S.C. § 112 (2001).
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ments for patentability. 212
However, many companies with access to a gene-
sequencing machine and a genomic library can sequence
genes and extrapolate EST functions almost instantane-
ously.212 Thus, two unrelated companies could sequence the
same gene and infer the same functions, directly conflicting
with the definition of nonobviousness. In other words, the
scientific information available about proteins, DNA, amino
acids, and extrapolated EST functions renders the gene frag-
ment obvious as soon as any sequencer splices up the gene.
D. The Revised Guidelines Addressing the Utility and
Written Description Requirements
Since the USPTO's guidelines mainly serve to train its
examiners and inform the public, they do not have any power
within the legal system itself.214 As such, courts must deter-
mine the scope of claims under the new guidelines."5 The
USPTO solicited volunteer applicants to test the sufficiency
and legal applicability of its new guidelines.2 16 As a result, a
test case involving a volunteer private company with a gene
patent application most likely will go to the federal court.217
The new guidelines do not greatly affect the former pat-
entability standards of genomic technologies, and the privati-
zation of genes has not slowed."' For instance, despite the
advent of the new rules for patentability, the general counsel
of Incyte expressed his confidence in the patentability of the
company's 1.2 million EST applications by stating, "We never
filed applications where we didn't know what the EST did." 19
The utility requirement is met if "a person of ordinary
skill in the art would immediately appreciate why the inven-
tion is useful based on the characteristics of the invention"
and if "the utility is specific, substantial, and credible.""22 The
212. See Goozner, supra note 27, at 23.
213. See id.
214. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-02, 1097-98 (Jan.
5, 2001).
215. See id.
216. See Greene, supra note 44, at 5.
217. Seeid.
218. See Goozner, supra note 27, at 23.
219. Enserink, supra note 4, at 1196.
220. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-102, 1098 (Jan. 5,
2001).
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USPTO defines "credible" as whether someone of ordinary
skill in the art would believe the asserted utility based on the
totality of evidence.' However, the guidelines specifically
state that an applicant only needs to provide one credible util-
ity for each claimed invention 2 and that a patent cannot be
withheld "until another, or better, use is discovered." 223 Any
higher, better, or more practical use is an inurement of the
starting point provided by original disclosure, and a benefit of
the patent system. 224
Specific and substantial utility refers to usefulness for
any particular, practical purpose.225 This requirement ex-
cludes "throw-away," "insubstantial," or "nonspecific" uses
226
and refers to practical, real-world uses.27 However, commer-
cial viability of a product is not required to establish useful-
228
ness.
The requirements for written description are embodied in
35 U.S.C. § 112. In general, the applicant must show that he
actually invented what he claims and that he possessed the
claimed invention at the time of application. 9 Under the
guidelines, rejection for inadequate written description
should be rare because of the strong presumption that the re-
quirements embodied in § 112 are present in patent applica-
tions."' In relation to gene fragments, the guidelines state
that description of the "complete chemical structure, i.e., the
DNA sequence, of a claimed DNA is one method of satisfying
the written description requirement, but it is not the only
method."231 "There is no basis for a per se rule requiring dis-
closure of complete DNA sequences or limiting DNA claims to
only the sequence disclosed," since DNA can be described by
its structure, formula, chemical, name, or physical proper-
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. Id. at 1094.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 1098.
226. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-102, 1098 (Jan. 5,
2001).
227. See id at 1094.
228. See id.
229. See Vas-Cath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
230. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-02, 1105 (Jan. 5,
2001).
231. Id. at 1101.
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ties.232
Issues of inequity are unresolved because private compa-
nies based some of their gene patent applications on prior,
publicly disclosed NIH research.2 3  The USPTO still would
grant Human Genome Sciences' original patent application
for the CCR5 gene under the revised standards.2"4 As such,
holders of gene patents can continue to receive a windfall
from more thorough, subsequent research.
Although the institution of a compulsory licensing system
may combat this problem, companies would no longer control
their profits and thus, may not invest the large capital needed
to conduct research.2 5 Alternatively, the USPTO could insti-
tute an exception to patent rights granted for gene fragments.
The commercial monopoly rights given to a patentee of an
EST could be not only time-limited, but also disclosure-
limited.236  Researchers may be inspired to make further
discoveries in order to have broader disclosures and thus
broader monopoly claims.2 7 However, this proposal also may
have the opposite effect. Often, research companies recoup
their investments through licensing agreements with subse-
quent researchers. Companies may no longer want to invest
large amounts of money into projects with such limited poten-
tial for future commercial rights. Further, the USPTO may
not be able to distinguish the breadth of disclosure claims or
to argue against the patent's increased presumption of valid-
ity when later attempting to narrow a claim against the pat-
entee. Tougher requirements will lead to stronger, more en-
forceable patents.238 Once the USPTO grants a gene patent
under the new rules, opposers will have more difficulty in-
validating the patent. 9
V. PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER REFORM
The new guidelines do not preclude EST patents and do
not adequately address the aforementioned issues concerning
232. Id.
233. SeeJosefson, supra note 31, at 228.
234. See Luukkonen, supra note 196, at 354.
235. See McBride, supra note 179, at 534.
236. See Luukkonen, supra note 196, at 366.
237. See id.
238. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2001) (stating that a patent and each of its claims
shall be presumed valid).
239. See id.
329
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
them. Although the USPTO's revisions are a step in the right
direction, the USPTO would benefit from raising the bar on
patentability soon. Because the patent system originated in
the Constitution, the founders could not have predicted the
innovations in biotechnology. History shows that legal doc-
trines change with time.14' Thus, changes in USPTO regula-
tions cannot be too prescriptive in a single reform, especially
in view of the biotechnology field where new inventions may
present new problems to existing laws. 4 ' Similar to Con-
gress, which aptly responds to a problem at the time the prob-
lem presents itself, the USPTO should take small, reforma-
tory steps. In the words of Justice William Douglas,
"[R]eform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the
phase of the problem which seems most acute ...""'
The present controversy also suggests an immediate need
for government intervention. When ideas and innovations
such as novel gene therapies or diagnostic tests remain out of
the public domain, society's health and welfare suffer. 43
These overriding national interests demand attention from
the legislature and implementation of substantive laws and
restrictions on gene patentability. Meanwhile, genetic appli-
cations continue to stream into the USPTO. 4 Thus, the
USPTO needs to take prompt action to strengthen its re-
quirements for patents.
A. Raise the Nonobviousness Bar
Recent USPTO revisions only encompass issues of utility
and written description, and do not raise the bar for nonobvi-
ousness." A higher standard under 35 U.S.C. § 103 provi-
sions would require researchers to better understand genomic
function and could spur companies to relate the EST to a par-
ticular disease, drug therapy, or diagnostic test. With in-
creased quality of disclosure, comes the strengthening of pat-
240. See, e.g., Am. Fed'n. of Labor v. Am. Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949); Sem-
ler v. Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
241. See Enserink, supra note 4, at 1196.
242. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
243. See Enserink, supra note 4, at 1196.
244. See Greene, supra note 44, at 5.
245. See also Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 11, at 179 (arguing for the ele-
vation of the nonobviousness standard for genomic inventions set forth in In re
Deue).
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ent validity.24
B. Require Different Standards for Different Technologies
To raise the bar, the USPTO also could require different
standards or protection for different technologies. Although
the new guidelines target gene patents, these provisions are
unlikely to deter research companies from pursuing gene pat-
ents4 7 and actually may hinder the pursuit of other types of
technology patents. To address the issues presented by these
EST patents, the USPTO must link a concrete, technical ef-
fect with the revised utility assessment for gene patents only.
Thus, companies could not claim use as a probe for an un-
specified target for gene patentability, and companies like
Celera would have to invest more time and effort into re-
searching its gene fragments after their promulgation by a
machine.
C, Return to Brenner
The advent of patented genomic technologies and inequi-
ties that may ensue provides an impetus for the USPTO and
patent law to return to the standard set forth by the Brenner
court.248 Brenner stipulated that before a patent may issue,
an invention must have a specific benefit in a currently avail-
able form.249 This heightened utility standard should narrow
the overbroad protection of a gene patent with non-precise
functions or gene patents with utilities insufficient to justify
broad product claims. Limitations on the claimed subject
matter will also facilitate subsequent researchers who could
either invent around the patent or develop technologies en-
tirely novel from the original claims of the patent. In turn,
the public will benefit from decreased cost, because of large
companies' inability to demand royalties for the basic EST of
previously unclaimed therapeutic uses. Additionally, a re-
turn to the Brenner standard would deter companies from fil-
ing applications with the USPTO until they have performed
further research beyond the use of a sequencing machine.
246. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2001).
247. See Enserink, supra note 4, at 1196.
248. See also Zuhn, supra note 52, at 998 (discussing the utility requirement
in relation to the patentability of DNA sequences with no known function).
249. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).
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D. Institute a Morality Requirement
The U.S. patent system may also benefit from emulating
the additional requirements adopted by the European Patent
Convention (EPC). Under the codes of the EPC, an applicant
must show that his or her invention 1) is susceptible to indus-
trial invention, 2) is new, and 3) involves an industrial step. 5 °
These provisions correlate to the USPTO's requirements of
utility, novelty, and nonobviousness. In contrast to the U.S.
patent system, which fails to address any of the moral or
ethical concerns from genomic inventions, the EPC regulates
the patentability of the human genome and does not grant
patents, which would be contrary to ordre public or moral-
ity.25' Specifically, the human body, its elements, and the
complete or partial structure of a gene at any stage are not
patentable.2" However, the EPC can grant a patent to the
function of a gene if the possibility of a useful drug or therapy
can be shown, or if the patent sufficiently and specifically
identifies the intended use of the gene. 53
Although a morality requirement may help address the
issue of gene patentability in the U.S., this requirement fails
to account for the resources and funding used during re-
search. Because morality is rooted within the accepted norms
of a society,254 it comprises a somewhat intangible quality that
may change over time. Knowledge that a patent may not is-
sue based on an intangible, variable standard may deter
companies from investing money into genomic research with-
out the significant assurance of exclusive commercial rights.
Thus, a definite move towards imposing a morality standard
may hinder the goals of patent law. However, Europe's sys-
tem may provide helpful guidance for the U.S. as the USPTO
tries to further reform its guidelines. Small steps rather than
giant leaps are necessary for effective reform.
E. Post-Patent Issuance Remedies
As previously stated, an aggressive, initial reformatory
250. See Lydia Nenow, Comment, To Patent or Not to Patent. The European
Union's New Biotech Directive, 23 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 569, 584 (2001).
251. Seeid.
252. See Muchmore, supra note 36, at 56.
253. See id.
254. See Nenow, supra note 250, at 585.
255. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
332 [Vo1:44
2003] PA TENTING GENOMIC TECHNOLOGY
step will not help. If the USPTO moves towards a policy of
rejecting the patentability of genes, commercial incentive to
invent would wane, and the promotion of sciences would not
occur.256 Limitations on commercial monopolies with respect
to time as well as disclosure is not advised.257 Because the
USPTO should not have to bandage problems after issuance
of a gene patent, the USPTO should make reforms during the
review of patent applications.
VI. CONCLUSION
The economic, scientific, ethical, and practical implica-
tions over the patentability of genes influenced the USPTO to
revise its guidelines, resulting in higher standards for utility
and written description. Despite the changes, many of the
same issues continue to face researchers and U.S. patent ex-
aminers. Although the 2001 amendments speak to the need
for harmonization between the legislative goals of patent laws
and the inconsistencies with emerging technologies, much
more change is needed.
Though the USPTO could attempt post-patent issuance
remedies, the patent office should address the problems well
before legal battles over validity arise. Reforms should in-
clude raising the bar for nonobviousness, requiring stricter
standards for gene-related patents, going back to a stricter
Brenner standard, instituting a morality requirement, and
perhaps limiting the commercial scope to claimed utilities. In
order to avoid problems such as complete subject matter ex-
clusion, these small steps will lead to effective reform in gene
patenting and a much more equitable patent system for indi-
vidual researchers, biotechnology companies, and society.
256. See McBride, supra note 179, at 534.
257. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
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